Digested information, a non-semantic motivation for agent-agent interaction by Salge, Christoph
Digested Information, a Non-Semantic Motivation for Agent-Agent Interaction 
Christoph Salge 
Adaptive Systems Research Group, University of Hertfordshire 
Address for correspondence: Science and Technology Research Institute (STRI), University 




Digested Information is a theory that aims to explain, at the non-semantic level of 
Information Theory, why it makes sense for one agent to observe another. Based on the 
formalism of Relevant Information, defined as the minimum amount of information an agent 
needs in order to determine its optimal strategy, I argue that, following its own motivation, an 
agent (1) obtains relevant information from the environment (2) displays it in the 
environment through its own actions, and (3) is likely to display information in a higher 
density in regard to its bandwidth than other parts of the environment. Furthermore, I argue 
that this information is also relevant to other, similar, agents and that this could be used to 
motivate agent-agent interaction (such as observing other agents) in a framework where agent 




Modelling agent-world interaction in terms of Information Theory (Shannon 1948) has advanced our 
understanding of simple AI mechanisms. For example, Klyubin (2005) and  Der (1999) have 
demonstrated that simple “intelligent” behaviour can be created by agent centric maximisation of 
channel capacity and information parsimony (Tishby 1999); all while staying purely “syntactical” 
(Nehaniv 1999), that is, while there is no actual meaning assigned to input or output states, as in 
symbolic AI. Also, work in biology (Vergassola 2007, Dauchin 2004) suggests that similar Shannon 
information based mechanism could explain basic animal behaviour. I argue that those principles 
can be used to motivate both agent-agent interaction and the development of the simple abilities 
needed for it, such as attention towards other agents, or the ability to even identify another agent.  
The argument presented uses the term information, associated with Shannon’s Information Theory, 
as the mutual information (Shannon 1948) between two random variables X and Y. Consequently, 
the world is described as a set of random variables, which can be modelled as a Causal Bayesian 
Network as described by Pearl (2000). To define an agent in this world one first divides all the 
random variables into either belonging or not belonging to the agent. The non-agent variables are 
used to form a compound random variable, called the environment R. Furthermore, the agent is 
organised into three sets of random variables, the sensors S, the actuators A and the memory M.  
It is assumed that the agent’s actions are connected to some unspecified form of utility function (for 
example survival probability, or fitness), which determines the different payoffs, depending on the 
agent's action and the state of the environment. For every state of the environment, there exists a 
set of actions which result in the highest expected utility; a collection of such actions for each state 
of the world is called an optimal strategy. 
Relevant Information is defined (Polani 2001) as the (minimal) average amount of information the 
agent needs to acquire from the environment to act according to one optimal strategy. 
Mathematically, this is defined as the minimal amount of mutual information between R and A for 
all optimal strategies.  
However, since the mutual information is symmetric, the relevant information is not only the 
amount the agent has to obtain through its sensors, it is also the amount of information its actions 
contain about the environment. If the agent uses one of the optimal strategies, it has to act 
accordingly, and displays (automatically) in its actions at least the amount of relevant information, 
simply in virtue of acting optimally.  
By extension, the relevant information of a sub-optimal payoff level is defined as the minimum 
mutual information of all strategies that reach that payoff level (Polani 2006). Thereby, any sub-
optimal strategy requires less, or the same amount of relevant information. Conversely, an agent 
that increases its payoff level by choosing a better strategy increases the amount of relevant 
information, both obtained and displayed, or at least keeps it the same. This gives agents an 
incentive to increase the relevant information displayed in their actions, since it is a by-product of 
increasing their performance.  
Furthermore, the agent's actions typically have a much smaller state space than the rest of the 
environment, and hence a much smaller bandwidth, but still need to contain the same amount of 
relevant information. This creates an “Information Bottleneck” (Tishby 1999), and it indicates that 
the agent’s actions could contain a much higher “concentration” of relevant information per bit than 
other parts of the environment.   
To support this claim we have implemented a grid world scenario where artificial agents search for 
the location of food (Salge 2009), controlled by a biologically inspired Infotaxis search (Vergassola 
2007). Our simulation showed that agents’ actions contained: 
a. relevant information (measured as mutual information between actions A and a random 
variable F denoting the location of the food) 
b. more relevant information per bit than any other part of the environment 
c. more relevant information if the agents performance increased  
Now consider a scenario with several agents that have a similar embodiment and utility, and 
therefore need to obtain similar relevant information. In this case, the actions of one agent are part 
of the environment of another agent, which can obtain its relevant information also by observing the 
other agent. Given the prior results, this seems a sensible thing to do, especially if an agent can only 
use a specified amount of sensor bandwidth to observe the environment.  
An extension of the experiment in (Salge 2009) demonstrates that agents that perform a Bayesian 
update with other agents’ actions are not only able to outperform those which do not, but also 
outperform the mathematically optimal strategy for any single agent. The limitation of the optimal 
performance is determined limited amount of information about the environment the agent can 
gain per time step, if the agent is only observing the non-agent environment. Therefore, to perform 
better, the agent has to obtain (relevant) information from the actions of other agents which is 
unobtainable from the rest of the environment. The presence of this additional information, which is 
not present in the current local environment of the two agents, can be explained via the agent’s 
memory. By retaining information about the environment the agent creates a channel from an 
information source, which is spatially or temporally removed, to its current, local actions.  
Concluding, the “Digested Information”, the relevant information present in an agent’s action, has 
several qualities that make it beneficial for other, similar agent to observe those actions. Especially 
interesting is the likely higher per bit density of relevant information if an agent has only a limited 
amount of sensor bandwidth to obtain information from the environment. Also, the possibility of 
gaining information in a place and time removed from the original source is very helpful for an agent 
aiming to maximize its information about the environment.  
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